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FORGIVENESS: A CHRISTIAN MODELl
Marilyn McCord Adams

Recent literature on the topic of forgiveness explores the question whether,
in the field of secular ethics, forgiveness is not a flower but a weed. After
analyzing approaches by A. Kolnai, P. 1Wambley, J. Murphy, and H. Morris,
I sketch a theological point of view and offer my own characterization of
forgiveness, contending that the latter is "at home" within the former. My
methodological moral is that, given the differential adaptability of forgiveness to (at least some) secular and religious value theories, Christian philosophers risk distortion when they fail to integrate their ethical reflections with
their theological commitments.

Introduction:
When I was an undergraduate philosophy major, the professor of our "History
of Ethics" course spent the first lecture defending the viability of Ethics as
a subject distinct and independent from religion. Reviewing the syllabus
(which included Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, and Mill), he allowed as
how the medieval period, which we were skipping, was the most fascinating
in the history of ethics. But, as if further to enforce his division, he concluded
with the warning that we could not bring God into any of our ethical reasoning
in that class, unless we had a rational proof of His existence. Although
agnostic at the time, I had been raised in the "Bible Belt," where God and
oughts are inseparably connected. After two courses, I found myself unable
to comprehend what secular ethics was about. So I abandoned all study of it
in favor of metaphysics and epistemology.
Having entered into my own "medieval period," I regret my youthful haste
and feel drawn to re-examine my teacher's curious ambivalence. Looking
back, I suppose he found himself in the position of many philosophers: unable
to accept the ontological commitments of traditional religion, yet drawn to
many of its values. So he joined the effort to preserve the latter by fencing
off a new field, clear of dubious entities, in which to transplant them. The
verdict on the success of this general project is not yet in; certainly the
popularity of non-cognitivist and relativist approaches makes one wonder
whether the old values have really been preserved. Contrasts between consequentialist and deontological theories repeat the question, when the foundations are shifted, can the surface stay the same?
Happily, my present focus is much narrower, on the value of forgiveness
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and the series of recent articles asking whether in the field of secular ethics
it is not a flower but a weed. In what follows, I shall survey the stumbling
blocks, uncovered by Aurel Kolnai and Ieffrie G. Murphy, to the moral
propriety of forgiveness within a non-religious framework. After considering
alternative diagnoses and suggestions from P. 'IWambley and Herbert Morris,
I shall sketch a Christian model of forgiveness which avoids these obstacles,
while (to paraphrase Murphy) mining the secular discussion for nuggets of
religious value. 2
The moral of my story will be likewise limited. I shall not argue the
negative thesis-that the value of forgiveness cannot be successfully transplanted in the field of secular ethics. For, as we shall see, Kolnai's and
Murphy's worries can be traced to a distinctive point of view; 'IWambley
alludes to another. And it would take another paper to examine how the value
of forgiveness fares within a secular Aristotelian framework. Instead, I shall
defend the positive thesis-that forgiveness is a value that is particularly "at
home" within a Christian framework. The contrast between my model and
that of Kolnai or Murphy constitutes a weak "moral" argument for Christian
metaphysics: to the extent that one is drawn to a value best made sense of
within a given theoretical framework, one has some reason, however defeasible, to accept it. The differential adaptability of forgiveness to (at least
some) secular and religious value theories also illustrates the dangers for
Christian philosophers in not integrating ethical reflections with theological
commitments.
I. Kolnai's Paradox of Forgiveness

Aurel Kolnai's bold and blunt agenda is to reclaim the subject of forgiveness for ethics by disentangling it from its context in the Christian religion.
His intended method, "'rigorous' logical analysis"; his procedure, to sketch
the concept of forgiveness and formulate a paradox-that forgiveness, so
understood, is logically impossible-which he then tries to dissolve by more
subtle analysis. 3

(1.1) Delimitation of the Concept
Kolnai attempts, not so much a definition, but a preliminary characterization of forgiveness, which may be summarized in the following points: (i)
Forgiveness primordially refers to a context of interpersonal relationships, in
the narrow sense of relations between two parties on an equal footing (the
intended contrast apparently being with theological, political, or judicial contexts, in which one person has authority and jurisdiction over another).4 (ii)
Forgiveness presupposes an affront, injury, trespass, or offense committed by
one person against another. 5 (iii) Forgiveness "digs deep into its object" in
the sense that (a) the offense is recognized as such and imputed to the of-
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fender, and (b) the recognition and imputation of the offense is at first accompanied by indignation and a retributive attitude. 6 (iv) One can forgive only
offenses against oneself, but not the wrongs done to others. 7 (v) Forgiveness
involves an "explicit," "intentional," "conscious decisional" act, not just a "fading out" of emotional, cognitive, or attitudinal states about the offensive incident. s In particular, (vi) forgiveness involves (a) giving up or "nullifying" the
retributive attitude (b) without revising the judgment whereby one imputes the
offense. 9 Finally, Kolnai is inclined to see (vii) reconciliation as a possible result
based on, but not the essence of forgiveness. 1O
Conditions (i)-(vii) differentiate forgiveness from a variety of responses to
wrongdoing. But Kolnai is especially eager to contrast forgiveness with what
he calls "condonation": (let A be the offender and B the offended party) B
condones A's offense when (viii) B is clearly aware of A's offense, (ix) B per
se disapproves of such offense, but (x) B deliberately refrains from any
retributive response to A's action. Where forgiveness presupposes and then
nullifies "the original retributive position" condonation "acquiesces in the
offense," whether out of tolerance for weakness or prudence. I I
(1.2) Kolnai 's Aporetic Argument
Given this outline of what forgiveness involves, Kolnai proposes to argue
for the startling conclusion that
Forgiveness is logically impossible,

because only morally appropriate acts could genuinely count as forgiveness
(as opposed, e.g., to condonation) and yet no morally appropriate occasion
for forgiveness could arise. He regards this result as paradoxical, apparently
because we ordinarily assume that forgiveness is not merely a logically possible and morally appropriate, but also a virtuous response to wrongs against
ourselves.
Kolnai's reasoning begins from what purports to be a moral maxim "selfsufficient for interpersonal conduct":
MPl:

(a) Respond to value wholeheartedly, condemn and shun disvalue;
(b) be grateful for kindness done to you and reciprocate it; retaliate
(within the appropriate limits, without overstepping your rights
and lapsing into vindictiveness, without disproportionate hostility) for malicious wrong suffered. 12

MPJ(a) pertains to value and disvalue generally; MPJ(b) to actions. Nor-

mally, the moral responsibility of an agent for an act welds agent-evaluation
to action-evaluation in such a way that caeteris paribus a pro-attitude towards
the act dictates a pro-attitude towards the agent; a con-attitude towards the
act dictates a con-attitude towards the agent (and reasoning in reverse, a
pro-attitude towards the agent would presuppose a non-con-attitude towards
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the act; a con-attitude towards the agent, a non-pro-attitude towards the act).
But, Kolnai seems to assume, this link can be dissolved by another exercise
of moral responsibility by the agent, e.g. in repentance.
Consider a case in which an agent morally wrongs someone. Forgiveness
of the offense would involve (by condition (iii) above) a continuing con-attitude towards the offense, continued imputation of the offense (by condition
(vib», along with a non-con-attitude towards the agent (by condition (via».
Given MP 1 as construed above, Kolnai's argument takes the form of a dilemma, which can be reconstructed as follows. 13 Either the link between the
agent and his/her offensive action is broken or it is not. If it is not, then
agent-evaluation is determined by action-evaluation, and a non-con-attitude
towards the agent would presuppose a non-con-attitude (whether a pro-attitude or indifference) towards his action, contrary to condition (iii)-which
would amount to condonation (by condition (x» rather than forgiveness. On
the other hand, if the link between the agent and his/her offensive action is
broken, then it is already morally inappropriate to evaluate the agent from
that act, and so forgiveness (which would function to split off agent- from
act-evaluation) would be redundant.

(1.3) Complications as Solutions
A resolution of the paradox must envision a way of divorcing agent and
action so that a non-con-attitude towards the agent and a con-attitude towards
his/her action is (a) morally appropriate and both (b) logically and (c) psychologically possible (First Horn) without lapsing into redundancy (Second
Horn). Put otherwise, both horns of the dilemma can be averted only if it can
be morally permissible to take a non-con- or pro-attitude towards a subsistent
guilt. 14 For Kolnai, the key lies in the fact that agent-evaluation is more
complex than his paradoxical reasoning lets on. For one thing, an agent may
be metaphysically the same as the person who committed the offense, and
yet morally distance him/herself by having different attitudes in the present
than in the past towards the act of wrongdoing. And in general, agent-evaluation must be done against a wider context than that provided by a single
act. Metaphysical sameness justifies continued imputation (in accordance
with condition (vi.b) and so satisfies the demand for subsistent guilt), while
a changed attitude in the offender makes room for a change on the part of
the victim (as specified by condition (vLa» that does not betray the latter's
commitment to value. Kolnai identifies actual, probable, and even merely
possible repentance as the principal grounds for justifying the differentiated
response to agent and act, respectively. IS

(1.4) Notabilia
Several salient features of Kolnai's approach deserve highlighting here.
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(1.4.1) Forgiveness without Religion?
Ironically, although Kolnai offers much that is interesting and provocative,
he fails in his aim to extricate the concept of forgiveness from religion,
succeeding at most in transplanting it from one religion (Christianity) to
another (Morality). For his "negative," aporetic argument appeals to MPI as
the "First and Great Commandment," enjoining whole-hearted love of Value
and hatred of Disvalue. And his "positive" attempt to clear sizable ground in
which forgiveness could permissibly and even admirably grow, appeals to a
sacrificial commitment that demotes "concern about Certitude and Safety in
favour of a boldly, venturesomely aspiring and active pursuit of Value," one
which "expresses that attitude of trust in the world, which ... may be looked
upon ... as perhaps the epitome and culmination of morality."16 Thus, Kolnai
would not morally fault those moral saints who risk forgiveness even of
hardened wrongdoers on the mere possibility that the latter might repent. 17

(1.4.2) Judicial versus Medical Models
Kolnai initially scorns (although he later rehabilitates) "St. Augustine's
famous dictum 'Hate the sin, love the sinner'" as postulating "a neat separability between the sin and the sinner, which is fictitious, and insinuates a
wholly misleading analogy between wrongdoing and illness." This medical
model is mistaken, according to Kolnai, because the connection between the
agent and wrongdoing (unlike that of the patient and his/her illness) is one
of moral responsibility. Kolnai finds the medical model pernicious, because
it allegedly encourages condonation. 18 Yet, despite his announced intention
to eschew judicial contexts as paradigmatic for forgiveness, as P. 1\vambley
points out,19 judicial analogues infect his analyses of egalitarian, non-institutional, interpersonal situations. The moral agent who would react wholeheartedly and appropriately to Value and Disvalue is thrust into the role of judge,
insofar as s/he must evaluate objects, actions, and persons. For such a judge,
bound to render findings according to MP 1, people are either unworthy of
forgiveness on the one hand or too worthy to need it on the other. The judicial
model at first seems to combine with the moral meritarianiasm to leave no
room for forgiveness. Moreover, even when Kolnai thinks he has broken the
back of the paradox, his instinct is to measure the propriety of forgiveness
against the standard of obligation: although forgiveness is not a strict duty
like promise-keeping,20 yet "a credible change of heart" on the offender's
part can make forgiveness into a "quasi-obligation. "21 There may be some
cases in which forgiveness is entirely optional, but there are others in which
it would be proscribed as unwise and/or blended with immorality.22

(1.4.3) Moral Responsibility
Kolnai's treatment places moral responsibility, of offender and forgiver
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alike, front and center. As just noted, Kolnai insists against Augustine's dictum
that agent-evaluation follows act-evaluation through the link of moral responsibility. As 1\vambley points out, Kolnai feels most comfortable with forgiveness
when he can identify some way in which the offender has earned it, by a further
exercise of moral responsibility. On the other hand, forgiveness itself is a "conscious decisional" act for which the victim must render moral account. 23
(1.4.4) Forgiveness and the Emotions
By contrast, Kolnai's treatment does not spotlightthe emotions. Although
his preliminary sketch mentions indignation and a retributive attitude (in
condition (iii)) as appropriate first responses to wrongdoing, Kolnai does not
pursue the issue of whether or how indignation should be overcome. Nor does
he expand on what is involved in the retributive attitude. His focus is on
intentional acts and "judicial" judgments or findings.
(1.4.5) Forgiveness and Relationships

Since condition (i) specifies forgiveness as a move in the context of an
interpersonal relationship, it is bound to be constitutive of some change in
the relationship. Kolnai's treatment is less than clear about the kind of
change. On the one hand, he says that reconciliation is a possible result of
forgiveness, but not its essence (see condition (vii) above). On the other, he
cites possible prudential reasons for persevering in cool and distant relations
as a reason for thinking that forgiveness is not always even quasi-obligatory,
as if closer personal relationships were partially constitutive of, or at least a
necessary result of forgiveness after al1. 24
II. Twambley's Twist:
Twambley does not fault Kolnai's ambition to plant the topic of forgiveness
in the field of ethics. It is rather Kolnai's particular view of morality, its
apparent "obsession with duty and obligation,"25 that, in 1\vambley's opinion,
distorts the true character of forgiveness.
(2.1) The Civil Court Model

Having exposed the implicit judicial models in Kolnai's treatment,
1\vambley diagnoses the mistake, not in "going to court" for an understanding
of forgiveness, but in appealing "to the wrong"-that is to say, the criminal-"court. "26 In the criminal court, the judge assumes a legal obligation to
render findings in accordance with the criminal code; cases of putative leniency resolve into complex situations upon which many principles of the
legal code must be brought to bear, and in terms of which the less harsh
punishment must be legally justifiedY
Twambley proposes the civil court as a more adequate model: the paradigm
is one of a plaintiff having a right over a defendant; forgiveness is analogous
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to the plaintiff's waiving that right and releasing the defendant from obligation. 28 Other things being equal, the plaintiff in a civil suit has no (moral or
legal) obligation to press his/her claim, and no (moral or legal) obligation to
waive it. His/her doing one thing rather than another is a (morally and legally)
"free" act. Similarly, while agreeing with Kolnai that (v) forgiveness is an
explicit, conscious decisional act, 1\vambley insists, forgiveness is gratuitous. It may be motivated by diverse reasons. One may forgive "for old
time's sake," or in hope of future reconciliation, or from reasoning by analogy
out of a deep awareness of one's own liability to offend. But these do not
have the status either of morally justifying or morally obliging reasons, but
rather of explanatory motives. 29
(2.2) Twambley's Refocusing
Having cleared moral space for the generosity of forgiveness with his
brilliant model-shift, 1\vambley nuances Kolnai's analysis in several further
ways. (a) Following Bishop Butler, 1\vambley brings forgiveness into connection with the emotions, when he construes forgiveness as the opposite
number of resentment. Applying his civil court analogy, Twambley explains,
..... by offending you a man, as it were, incurs a debt (hence we talk of owing
recompense, reparation, and apology). You are within your rights to resent
his action. In forgiving him, you relinquish that right, you readjust your
relationship to one of equality."30

(b) Twambley notes how his account meets Kolnai's conditions (iii) and (vi);
for, on the civil court analogy, a right may be waived without the plaintiff's
changing his/her evaluation of the defendant's past act or ceasing to impute that
act to the defendant. It is the liability or obligation to compensate from which
the defendant is set free (Twambley's analogue of letting go of the retributive
attitude). (c) Moreover, reflecting on his civil court model, 1\vambley insists that
forgiveness is performative in character-one does not simply treat the offender
as ifs/he did not "owe," one releases him/her from that debt-which Kolnai's
phrase "letting go of the retributive attitude" obscures. (d) While his model
preserves Kolnai's original intuition (i) that the primordial context for forgiveness is interpersonal relationships among equals, Twambley broadens the scope
of forgiveness with the contention (iv') that one may forgive (just as one may
bring civil suit with regard to) not only offenses against oneself, but also wrongs
done to those with whom one identifies. 31 (e) Finally, like Kolnai, 1\vambley
could be clearer about what kind of effect forgiveness has on which sorts of
relationships. His civil court model suggests that forgiveness constitutes (by
virtue of its performative character) a formal change in the relationship between
two parties: it restores "equality" in the sense that, other things being equal, now
neither party "owes" the other. Other comments-such as that forgiveness bears
the other no grudge, refuses to let the action be an impediment to relationship,
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and may be tendered for old time's sake and out of a desire for future
unity-suggest contexts of close personal interaction.32
III. Murphy's Metamorphosis:
leffrie Murphy's lively and provocative discussion interweaves themes
from both Kolnai and 1\vambley with concerns of his own.
(3.1) Forgiveness in a Secular World?
Like Kolnai, Murphy wishes to assess the nature and propriety of forgiveness in a non-religious context for the straight-forward reason that it is important to guide one's life against a realistic picture of the world, whereas
metaphysical claims of transcendent reality are, he is convinced, false. 33 For
Murphy as for Kolnai, morality takes the place of religion, commanding our
ultimate allegiance and loyalty. Moreover, although Murphy adopts
1\vambley's civil (or private) law model in a recent discussion of mercy,34
Murphy retains Kolnai's implicit criminal law model of morality, with its
focus on obligation and duties (see section II above). Following Butler, Murphy summarizes our fundamental obligations in terms of (MP2) respect for
self and others as moral agents, and respect for moral principles. 3s
Murphy is concerned lest the aura of approval enjoyed by forgiveness
within the religious context be unreasonably and unconsciously imported into
a secular world view. Bringing matters out into the open, his explicit challenge is whether some alternatives to forgiveness are not morally permissible
or even morally required. 36
(3.2) Forgiveness and Feelings
Like Butler and Twambley, Murphy opposes forgiveness to resentment, and
in the end defines 'forgiveness' as the (i) "overcoming"37 or (ii) "foreswearing"38 of resentment towards or (iii) the "ceasing to resent"39 another who
has done one moral injury or harm (e.g. violated one's rights)40 (iv) for moral
reasons.41 And he insists that, "Forgiveness is primarily a matter of how I
feel about you (not how I treat you). "42 Murphy's point requires some clarification here. If resentment is, on Murphy's construal, a form of anger or
hatred, and thus a feeling or emotion,43 Murphy does not really understand
forgiveness to be a contrasting feeling or emotion. While (iii) ceasing might
be an event that simply happens to one, (i) "overcoming" generally,44 and
"overcoming ... for moral reasons" in particular, suggest agent effort, while
(ii) "foreswearing" sounds like a deliberate act, on the model of legal oathtaking. Murphy's picture is that forgiveness itself either is or at least involves
some of what Kolnai terms "conscious decisional acts," but these acts are
directed primarily at changing one's feelings or emotions, rather than one's
behavior. Murphy's move is significant, because it imitates Butler's in mak-
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ing the propriety and function of certain feelings central to the issue of the
moral propriety of forgiveness.

(3.3) Symbolic Communications of Respect
Murphy recognizes that both actions and feelings or emotions have symbolic content; in particular, many assert or express respect/disrespect for
persons and moral principles. Connecting the issue of respect/disrespect for
persons with the notion of relative status, Murphy maintains that intentional
acts of wrongdoing
"are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us 'I count and you do not,' 'I can use
you for my purposes,' or 'I am here up high and you are there down below'"

and so are insults, which express lack of respect and attempt to degrade usY
Likewise, feelings of indignation or resentment at perceived wrongdoing may
express or signify respect for the person wronged and for the moral principles
violated; failure to experience such feelings might thus be symptomatic of lack
of morally obligatory respect. 46 Murphy contends that even retributive hatred,
which he identifies as the desire to see someone hurt in order to restore the proper
moral balance of whatever goods are in question, expresses respect for the victim
and principles of justice. 47 It is the symbolic content and expressive power of
such feelings that makes them subject to moral evaluation.

(3.4) The Moral Permissibility of Forgiveness
Suppose A wrongs B by committing an offense of type K. On Murphy's
view, Kolnai's First Horn threatens again: for how can B forgive A without
failing to show the proper respect for "the moral value incarnate:' in him/herself and/or for the moral principle forbidding acts of type K? It will be
possible for B to forgive A without condoning A's K-ing, only if there is some
moral reason to differentiate the response to A from that to A's act of K-ing.
Like Kolnai, Murphy finds the best grounds in reasons for divorcing A from
his/her action: (i) A distances him/herself from his/her act of K-ing through
sincere or credible change of heart; (ii) B may forgive A "for old time's sake"
thereby identifying A more with past "person-stages" than with the "personstage" that committed the action; (iii) it may be that A meant well and
therefore did not really intend the insult symbolically expressed by the action.
Murphy also subsumes under the rubric of divorce the considerations (iv) that
A has undergone humiliation (perhaps the ritual humiliation of an apology),
or (v) that A has suffered enough (whether through physical pain or some
other loss). But while apology does count as ritual repentance, (iv) would
seem to make forgiveness compatible with B's self-respect, because humiliation may cancel the message symbolically expressed by A's wrongdoingthat A is above B; likewise (v) deep suffering shows that A is not above the
human condition the way his/her wrong-doing claimed. 48
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Examining two other putative grounds, Murphy concedes it might be compatible with self-respect (vi) for B to forgive A in order to reform A, looking
as it would towards a future divorce between A and his/her wrong action; but,
depending on the circumstances, such forgiveness might be paternalistic,
manipulative, or condescending, and so incompatible with B's respect for A.49
Finally, he considers whether one might not legitimately forgive (vii) by
appeal to the (Kantian) Golden Rule, recognizing that we ourselves need to
be forgiven. Murphy concludes that
"Only a person so arrogant as to believe that he will never wrong others or
need to be forgiven by them could (in Kantian language) consistently will
membership in a world without forgiveness."so

Hence, we will all have the obligation to cultivate "at least the willingness
to be open to the possibility of forgiveness with some hope and truSt."SI
Thus, Murphy is willing to recognize that forgiveness on grounds (i)-(v)
could be compatible with (MP2) respect for self and others as moral
agents, and respect for moral principles, and so would not be morally
inappropriate. Nevertheless, he hastens to add, it would not be morally
obligatory either. S2

(3.5) Forgiveness, Retribution, and Relationship
For Murphy, the way to recognizing the compossibility of forgiveness with
self-respect is cleared in part by his more limited estimate of its implications.
(a) If Kolnai speaks of forgiveness in terms of letting go of "the retributive
attitude," and Twambley compares forgiveness to a plaintiff's waiving his/her
right to damages and thereby releasing the defendant from indebtedness,
Murphy insists that forgiveness may be "quite compatible with still demanding certain harsh public consequences for the wrongdoer" -e.g., that the
embezzler repay the stolen funds or even suffer "just legal punishment" for
his/her crime. s3 Moreover, (b) although Murphy says that forgiveness does
alter the relationship between offender and victim in the sense of restoring
"moral equality" (although Murphy does not explain what he means by this),
(c) he insists that it need not involve the victim's trusting the offender (e.g.,
the embezzler with more money).S4 For Murphy, forgiveness essentially alters
some formal aspect of the relationship between the two parties, but does not
essentially involve renewed personal intimacy.

(3.6) The Moral Legitimacy of Retributive Emotions
We have already noted Murphy's view that indignation and resentment are
not only morally legitimate, but perhaps often even morally required as first
or early responses to wrongdoing. For such emotions express respect for the
injured parties and for the moral principles violated. As Murphy sees it, even
where forgiveness is morally permissible, continued resentment will also be
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morally allowable; it is only the disposition never to forgive that is proscribed
by the Kantian Golden Rule.
In a later essay, Murphy considers whether retributive hatred, which he
identifies as (i) the desire to see someone hurt (ii) in order that s/he may
receive his/her just deserts, is not sometimes morally permitted, indeed even
institutionalized in the criminal code. 55 To give this idea a fair chance, Murphy urges, we must consider central cases
"where hatred appears at its best and most prima facie justified-examples
where a person (i) has in fact been treated very immorally, (ii) has been hurt
badly by the immoral treatment, (iii) reasonably believes the wrongdoer is
totally unrepentant of the wrongdoing and (iv) is in fact living a life of
freedom and contentment, and-given all that-hates the wrongdoer and
desires that the wrongdoer suffer."56

He instances the Camelback rapist, who, in Murphy's estimate, "utterly trashed
the lives" of the women he raped. 57 Murphy argues that given a Retributive
Theory of Punishment, according to which some people deserve to suffer, retributive hatred on the part of the victim could be at once an expression of
self-respect and of his/her loyalty to moral principles; its acting out, part of a
strategy for seeing to it that justice is done. 58 As such, Murphy finds, it would
be "neither irrational nor immoral"59 but rather "in principle vindicated as a
permissible, if not mandatory, response of a victim to wrongdoing."oo
Murphy softens this startling conclusion by noting several Kantian cautions
against having, acting out, and/or making a habit of such hatred. For even if
retributive hatred were in principle justifiable in certain cases, to know where it
was justified, one would have to adopt the position of judge; to act it out, the
role of rightful punisher. But continuing the criminal court model, Kant challenges our authority to judge another: as guilty, we lack moral standing to accuse
another6'; as unable to penetrate human hearts and know people's true maxims,
we are too ignorant. 62 Moreover, as noted above, our guilt combines with the
Kantian Golden Rule to give us reason to wish that the manager of the universe
is forgiving of ourselves and others.63 Murphy sees some force in the first, but
is not utterly convinced by the second of these points. Having conceded (see
section 3.4 above) that we could not reasonably will a world free from forgiveness, Murphy insists that we should not want a world utterly devoid of retributive hatred either, because such passion serves as an instrument of justice. 64

IV. Herbert Morris' Critique of Murphy:
Herbert Morris is puzzled about Murphy's definition of "forgiveness" as
"foreswearing/overcoming resentment for moral reasons."

(4.1) "Conscious Decisional Act"?
Murphy has followed Kolnai in treating forgiveness as if it were, or essen-
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tially involved, "conscious decisional acts" which are subject, like other such
acts, to moral evaluation, and-given the putative moral considerations in
favor of resentment-require moral justification.
(4.1.1) Not Entirely Voluntary
Morris suspects that forgiveness is a process, like growing flowers, in
which there are acts that we can take to "till the soil and sow the seed" and
that there are other acts which will almost certainly interfere with forgiveness; but in order for forgiveness to "burst into bloom" there must be other
causes at work, "the sun and the rain if you Will."65 "Beyond our action,"
Morris is drawn to the idea of "transcendence" or "grace" and "mystery" at
the heart of forgiveness.
(4.1.2) Moral Reasons?
On the one hand, Morris wonders how Murphy's "moral reasons" operate as
motivators to explain forgiveness, since it involves a process that is not entirely
within our voluntary contro1. 66 I myself agree with Murphy's rejoinder. If forgiveness does involve the doing of or refraining from some conscious voluntary
acts, "moral reasons" will act or not to motivate them in the ordinary way that
moral reasons are supposed to motivate: in part by convincing the person that
the action is morally justifiable and/or more so than its altematives. 67 On the
other hand, Morris suggests that conscious decisional acts involved in the process
of forgiveness could and do legitimately have other motives:
..... If one remains sensitive to the wrong done one and is forgiving, I am not
persuaded that self-respect or respect for others need be diminished by the
heart's capacity for generosity in the absence of moral reasons. One can retain
one's self-respect and respect for others when the predominant explanation
for forgiving is love .. 00"68

A moral reason is not, therefore, necessary.
(4.2) Letting Go of What?
Without denying that forgiveness involves relinquishing resentment, Morris
suspects that often, at the deepest levels, what must be let go of is a particular
concept of oneself. Citing Stendahl and Weil, Morris notes the phenomenon of
projecting onto other people images of persons we would "feel glory in being
connected with," relationship with whom would "feed our need to believe in our
own importance. "69 When others act in ways that contradict these expectations,
relinquishing resentment involves accepting the disappointment of lessened selfesteem. Morris thinks this sort of psychological mechanism explains the close
connection between forgiveness and issues of status: to forgive will mean
sacrificing the false pride involved in such projections. 70
Even if we agree with Murphy that resentment of the Camelback rapist by
his victims need not be a matter of undue self-preoccupation born of false
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pride and self-flattering projections,7) Morris' attention to such putatively
non-central cases leads him to a further insight-the "non-egoistic" nature
of forgiveness. True forgiveness, Morris believes, must issue from purity of
heart. To the extent that forgiveness is motivated in part by the self-aggrandizing picture of oneself as saintly, Morris contends, it is still contaminated
by an admixture of false pride. Given the tenacity and subtlety of this vice,
Morris counsels "humility" and "forbearing from too ready a certitude about
our ever truly forgiving another. "72
(4.3) Forgiveness as Welcome
Nor, according to Morris, is properly motivated overcoming of resentment
sufficient for forgiveness. For Morris regards a relationship ingredient"something like a welcoming back with open arms"-as an essential constituent of forgiveness. His paradigm is not that of merely formal relationship
changes (analogous to changes in legal relationships of indebtedness), but of
transformed personal intimacy between cohabitants of the same house.13
(4.4) Religious Dimensions
Morris concludes that an understanding of forgiveness calls one to take at
least a short step into the realm of mystery, because its occurrence is "a grace
of fate," what some call "the hand of God."74 Without contesting Murphy's
denial of God's existence, Morris invites him to see religious dimensions in
the phenomenon of forgiveness itself:
..... First, forgiveness is a mark of a benign universe, for it is a virtue that
benefits both the giver and the receiver, liberating both and capable of promoting a state of exaltation.
Second, forgiveness embodies generosity of spirit and is possible only through
over-coming our contingent connection with and investment in ourselves. It
is, in this respect, close to the divine, involving as it does some detachment from
self in circumstances where the pull runs deep in the opposite direction.
But finally, this good that reveals something we might fairly view as beyond
the merely human in us is importantly beyond the operation of our will. Many
the case where the heart has remained hardened despite intense desire, strenuous efforts and in the presence of good reason for it to be elsewhere. The
concept of grace, something that makes for the good that transcends what is
within our will's compass, allows for capturing this mystery ... ."75

For his part, Morris is not so much fearful as grateful for the possibility and
occasional reality of forgiveness, hailing it "a mysterious and beautiful aspect
of who we are. "76

V. Taking Stock: Optimism versus Pessimism:
Kolnai and Murphy stake out common ground, as follows: (I) Both
transplant the discussion of forgiveness from a religious to a religion-neu-
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tral context, in which the metaphysical commitments of religion are not
allowed to playa decisive role. (II) Both assume that Morality identifies what
is or ought to be the arena of a human being's most fundamental commitments. (III) Both are attracted to a moral rigorism, which construes morality
primarily in terms of duty and obligation, and urges a response to values,
actions, and people, according to their moral deserts. 1\vambley aptly
traces Kolnai's intuition to an underlying criminal court model, in which
departures from prima facie duties must be justified by appeal to the
complexity of the situation and appeal to other prima facie duties. This
Kolnai-Murphy approach makes any form of generosity morally problematic. And yet, forgiveness seems essentially to be the sort of thing to which
no one has a right.
The Murphy-Morris interchange hints at another correlation, between one's
attitude towards forgiveness and the Optimism or Pessimism of one's World
View. Optimists can reasonably see forgiveness as good and valuable, because they see the world as a "benign" place, where Value ultimately triumphs
over Disvalue, where persons will-at least on the whole and in the end-be
valued and appreciated, where loving and harmonious relationships are possible. In such a world, wrongdoing and even serious injury are not desperate
matters, because they will be defeated in the big picture, both cosmically and
within each individual's life.
On the other hand, if one's worldview affords no guarantees or even reason
to believe that Good will triumph over Evil, then grave and injurious offenses
are more threatening. Protection against them falls to human arrangements.
Society enshrines the values it wants protected in its version of legal rights
and duties. Murphy espouses this picture when he approves Judge Stephen's
claim that criminal law institutionalizes retributive emotions. Moral rigorism
in ethics, and insistence on the moral legitimacy and quasi-obligatory status
of retribution, are unsurprising concomitants of an outlook according to
which personal safety is in real jeopardy.77

VI. Theological Assumptions:
Christian commendation of forgiveness takes for granted a realistic optimism about the world and the possibilities for Divine-human collaboration
within it. Fundamentally, it deems forgiveness possible and good, because
the Creator, Governor, and Redeemer of the world is not a value-rigorist (3
la Kolnai, see section I above) but generous, gracious, and loving (as the
experience of forgiveness intimates to Morris, see section IV above).

(6.1) The Nature of God
The version of Christianity I am sketching goes beyond the common-place
philosophical conception of God, as necessarily existent, omnipotent, and
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omniscient, to affirm that God is a Trinity of persons, eternally connected by
identity-conferring relationships of self-giving love. The love of the Divine
persons for one another is so rich and so fertile that it issues in a will to create
a universe to manifest its wonders, more persons with whom to share their
love. Of all creatures, persons are metaphysically the best, because they are
made in God's image, able to become beings who can love creatively and
sacrificially the way God does.
(6.2) The Worth of Created Persons
Nevertheless, from a metaphysical point of view, creatures are "almost
nothing" when compared to God. Thus, although created persons have
great metaphysical worth compared to creatures of other kinds, and equal
value in relation to one another, their principal and incommensurate
source of worth is Divine love and generosity. The infinite and eternal
God takes overwhelming delight in each created person. Scriptures tell us
that He has eagerly anticipated the actuality of each one from eternity,
before the foundations of the world. Not only does Divine love graciously
confer immeasurable value on each created person, God expressed His
high regard for humans by identifying with our condition in the Incarnation, the persistence of that love in the passion Christ Who would have
been willing to suffer it even for one. With Divine love as the fundamental
standard of human worth, it follows trivially that the principal source of
human worth is not to be found in any competitive merits (metaphysical,
moral, intellectual, athletic, musical, etc.) humans have in relation to one
another, or in the regard other humans have and/or express for them. For
any disvalue in the latter two categories is engulfed 78 by the positive value
conferred by the former.
(6.3) The Well-Being of Created Persons
Likewise, the well-being of created persons finds its alpha and omega in
Divine love and power. On the version of Christianity I am developing here,
God is both willing and able to defeat79 evil utterly, not only at the cosmic
level, but also within the context of each individual life. 80 Said otherwise,
God has the competence and has made the commitment to see to it that each
created person has a life which is a great good to him/her on the whole, and
that contains no suffering that is both horrendous and meaningless.
For each created person, the primary source of meaning and satisfaction
will be found in his/her intimate personal relationship with God. This relationship will also be the context in which a created person can be best
convinced of his/her worth, because it is the place where God's love for the
individual is most vividly and intimately experienced. 81 Christians naturally
see it as to everyone's advantage to enter into this relationship as deeply as
one can in this world, as soon as possible. Talk of "beatific vision" advertises
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the conviction that the Blessed 1i"inity and growth into relationship with them,
will keep us fascinated and challenged forever in the life to come.

(6.4) Fundamental Commitments
Persons to Persons: According to Christians, a created person's primary
commitment should be to God, to love God above all else and for His own
sake. Thus, a Christian's most fundamental commitment is personalthrough Christ, to a relationship of loving intimacy with the Blessed Trinity-and not to MORALITY, its principles or ideals. This is important,
because impersonal principles or ideals cannot love you back (or in advance),
and (as we have seen in sections I, II, and V) they have only the limited power
of final causes to protect. By contrast, commitment to transcendent value is
linked, via Divine generosity, with a guaranteed source of personal wellbeing and affirmation. This does not mean, however, that a Christian will
lack any commitment to the wide extension of what his secular colleagues
regard as moral values; it is rather that such loyalty will be derivative from
or at best partially constitutive of his/her commitment to God. For the
Christian's personal intimacy with God will involve a sharing of view-points.
His/her love of God will bring a dedication to learning, as nearly as possible,
to see as God sees and loving as God loves, or at least as God wants and
enables one to see and love.
VII. A Christian Model of Forgiveness:
I would like now to show how this picture of our place in the scheme
of Divine generosity makes sense of the Dominical injunction to forgive.
My model-making, like that of other recent authors, involves some genre
conflations: my attempts to characterize forgiveness from a Christian perspective, and to quarrel with points made by others, may contain the
makings of but do not (as they stand) constitute an analysis of forgiveness.
Moreover, my argument will involve sketching a process through which
such forgiveness might occur. I do not say genuine Christian forgiveness
could not deviate from this route, or that other Christian models could not
be fashioned by those who agree, as by others who disagree, with my
theological assumptions. What I do claim is that my optimistic theological
picture and my model cohere in such a way as to exhibit Christian forgiveness
as an expression of, not alien to good and fundamental commitments.

(7.1) Contextual Preliminaries
I wish to restrict my attention to the forgiveness of one created person by
another. Since I wish to characterize Christian forgiveness, I will assume that
the offended party is a Christian; the offender mayor may not be. With
Kolnai, I think it best to begin with contexts of legal and political equality
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in which one person does not weild legal authority over another (as with a
judge over the defendants, or a king over his subjects). My first point is that
for a Christian, (i) the interpersonal context of forgiveness includes not only
the human parties to the dispute, but God who created and loves each and
both, the One to whom the Christian is most fundamentally committed.
What people undertake to forgive is offense-real or apparent. Although I
agree with Murphy that all wrongs symbolically signify (and sometimes
actually communicate) a falsehood about the victim's worth, I do not think
it right to reduce the category of injury to a sub-division of insult. Great
physical pain is a harm, its infliction in certain circumstances a wrong, quite
apart from its character as insult. Perhaps the same can be said for the state
of powerlessness. 82
Offense can be considered two ways-from the side of the "victim" and
from the side of the "offender." The authors discussed above all concur that
(ii) one has genuine occasion for forgiveness, only where there has been real
offense, injury, or trespass. Ordinary usage is vaguer. People often speak as
if their feeling of being offended were enough. To my mind, it doesn't much
matter how we adjudicate the linguistic issue, because forgiveness involves
a series of re-evaluations of the situation (see section 7.2 below). Things may
be better than they seem and/or worse than they seem, but they will always
be more complicated than at first they seem. 83
Considering offense from the side of the offender, I disagree with Kolnai
that forgiveness can only be of "responsible wrongdoing," if the latter
category is exhausted by what he calls "conscious decisional acts," or if
it implies that the harms suffered or insults tendered to the victim were
all fully and consciously intentional. My Christian model recognizes that
some of the deepest wounds are inflicted on their victims by agents who
in important senses "know not what they do." Racism and sexism are
pernicious because they involve patterns of unconscious motivation, by
which, amidst their "conscious decisional acts" and consciously intended
effects, the racist or sexist person perpetrates many other harms intentionality for which s/he would deny. Parents, too, consciously intending to
benefit their offspring, unconsciously "act out" their own inefficient adaptational strategies, contributing to deep problems in their children. Often
it is these latter harms, more than fully intentional ones, that adults work so
hard in courses of psychotherapy and spiritual direction to get over. Christian
usage takes its cue from Jesus just before His crucifixion, in regarding these
harms and offenses stemming from unconscious motivation as likewise forgivable.
Christian emphasis on persons' (divine or human) identifying with one
another, particularly in their sufferings, would hold with 1Wambley (iii) that
it is conceptually possible, and may be morally legitimate to forgive not only
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harms or wrongs to oneself, but also offenses against those with whom one
identifies. For example, in an ordinary case, one might forgive an offender
for wrongs committed against one's family or close friends. 84
Moreover, the one who forgives (iv) must view the offense as an offense
and (v) impute it to the person forgiven, at least in the sense of seeing it as
an action whose harmful effects issue from the agent's conscious or unconscious motivation.
Finally, our review of the literature suggests a distinction between two
modalities of forgiveness, which I shall label "performative forgiveness" and
"forgiveness from the heart." (a) Twambley's reference (in section 2.2
above) to the performative character of forgiveness reminds us that we have
a social/religious institution of forgiving. Like promising, performative forgiveness is a "conscious, decisional act," paradigmatically, a favorable response to an official or formal apology. More restricted than promising, the
institution of performative forgiveness is relevant to cases in which a civil
suit could be pressed but is legally and officially waived (as would be
predictable from Twambley's model). It also comes up in the routine, conventional, and public acceptance of apologies for small injuries (as in the
''I'm sorry"/"That's ok" interchange between strangers who accidentally
collide or step on one another's toes in a crowd). Performative forgiveness
contrasts with the victim's merely failing or deciding not to press his/her
rights, in that it must be publicly declared, whether to the offender or to
some appropriate official personage. Our institution of performative forgiveness focuses on externals (material compensations or behavior) and the
formal structure of relationships, not on inner attitudes or feelings. After all,
my verbal utterance may constitute an acceptance of your apology, but it
cannot thereby effect an immediate change in my psychological dispositions.
In public exchanges between strangers, performative forgiveness usually
carries no concomitant commitment to try to change attitudes or feelings
(e.g., towards the uninsured motorist who dented your fender or the stranger
who stepped on your toe).85 But when the institution is transferred to contexts of personal intimacy or religious contexts, where persons have
broader feeling- and attitude-commitments (as between husband and wife,
or God and humans), there is a moral or religious obligation that performative
forgiveness be accompanied by a commitment to (try to) (b) forgive from the
heart. 86

(7.2) Forgiveness from the Heart: A Process
Christian forgiveness will be imbedded in prayer, because it involves a process
of letting go of one's own point of view (regarding the situation, one's self and/or
the victim, and the offender) and entering into God's point of view. Typically,
this shift in perspective will involve many changes in feelings, attitudes, judg-
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ments, and desires, and will require many spiritual exercises. Usually, it will
involve the would-be forgiver in choosing many things that s/he knows not
to be within his/her voluntary control, with a prayer for God's help. To the
Christian (as to Morris), actual forgiveness is a manifold miracle.

(7.2.1) Role Release
It is natural to feel that (real or apparent) victimhood uniquely qualifies
one for the roles of judge, jury, and executioner. Surely being wronged puts
one in the right relative to the offender; the suffered loss makes one uniquely
informed of how bad what s/he has done is and what commensurate suffering
would be his/her due. Psychologically, of course, this is a half-truth, because
retributive emotions can cloud as much as experience informs. At any rate,
Christian forgiveness requires of the victim an initial and oft repeated choice
to relinquish these roles to God.
In fact, the Sermon on the Mount forbids these roles to Christians for good
reason. (i) First, no human being is competent to evaluate another human
person, or even him/herself. The throes of victimhood encourage one to
evaluate the agent from his/her offensive act alone (as Kolnai's initial
paradox assumes appropriate), when in fact there is so much more to the
value of a person: e.g., his/her other actions and his/her character, his/her
metaphysical value as a human being. Also relevant are the life difficulties
over against which the offender has had to develop as a person. From a
Christian standpoint, only God can see deeply enough into the human heart
to evaluate a person. Moreover, God alone is able to reckon the implications of the immeasurable worth conferred on each person by His love.
God is not interested in the death of the sinner but that s/he should turn
and live. He alone knows enough and loves enough to calculate the best
pedagogical response to the offender's action. (ii) Second, the more a
human person insists on judging out of the narrow strictures of his/her
knowledge and sympathies, the more s/he is blinded to the wideness of
Divine generosity (e.g., those who judge others harshly, are often harsh
judges of themselves, and find it hard to believe God is otherwise). Entrenchment in these roles becomes an obstacle to intimacy and collaboration with God, to deepening the relationship which is/should be the
primary locus of personal assurance and satisfaction.

(7.2.2) Radical Honesty
So far from being an exercise in psychic denial, Christian forgiveness
requires the victim to be radically honest at every stage about his/her reactions to the offense and the offender. As Kolnai puts it, the forgiveness must
"dig deeply into its object" (see section 1.1 above). All of the pain and
humiliation, all of the retributive and vindictive feelings and attitudes, will
be put out on the table between the victim and God in prayer. Psychologically,
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such venting is cathartic and healthy, as Murphy suggests. 87 Spiritually, such
candor is only part and parcel of the believer's fundamental commitment to
personal intimacy with God.

(7.2.3) Entering into God's Point of View
Personal intimacy is a two-way street, however. God invites the believer
to an exchange of viewpoints: First, the believer shares with God exactly how
things look to him/her. Then the believer prays to see how things (in particular, the victim, the offense, and the offender) look to God. Usually, the
victim's attempt to enter God's point of view will involve shifting from a
one-dimensional picture of the offender qua offender to a more complex
characterization, which recognizes him/her (i) as a person with problems, (ii)
in response to which s/he has deployed inefficient adaptational strategies,
(iii) resulting in behavior harmful to him/herself and others. The victim will
also acquire deeper insight into how God sees him/herself, sometimes (but
not always) as a person with similar problems and comparable faults. Offering
the latter for Divine healing and correction leaves the victim with a more
vivid sense of God's power to heal and/or redeem any injury and to "educate"
one out of bad adaptational strategies. Moreover, the victim's prayerful exchange with God will bring him/her to a deeper realization of God's love for
him/her and the overwhelming worth conferred on him/her thereby. At the
same time, such spiritual education at God's hand will bring the victim to let
go of the inappropriate projections and self-aggrandizing outlooks identified
by Morris, for the double reason that s/he will see him/herself from God's
point of view, and that her/his experience of God in the interchange will make
vivid for him/her how small s/he is in comparison to God. Such appropriations of Divine power and love to him/herself free the victim to appreciate
and enter into God's love for the offender and the overwhelming worth thus
conferred on him/her, and God's power to heal, redeem, and educate
him/her. Naturally, our human entry into God's perspective is always
incomplete due to our limited cognitive and emotional capacities for sympathetic identification. Moreover, relationships come in degrees; with collegial or more distant associations, our status as victims does not entitle
us to detailed analytical insight into the offender's personality and motives. We may expect God to protect their privacy, out of His love for
them, and to call us to entrust the offender to Him under the more abstract
description of 'another beloved child of God for whom Christ died. '88
Thus, my model does not press (as Murphy fears) the victim to acquiesce
in the estimate of his/her worth conveyed by the offense. Rather it sees
the latter contradicted and compensated by the healing power of Divine
love, whose omnipresent care builds a foundation for the transcendent,
non-egoistic character of forgiveness noticed by Morris.

FORGIVENESS: A CHRISTIAN MODEL

297

(7.2.4) Release of Retributive Emotions and Attitudes
Insofar as the Christian forgiver aims at turning the offender over to God's
loving dealing, s/he also chooses to let go of and prays to overcome various
retributive feelings and attitudes, contrary to Murphy but in agreement with
Kolnai. On the one hand, this will be included in the victim's prayer to love
as God loves; for, given my theological assumptions, God is not interested
in retribution, but in reform. Granted, such emotions symbolically assert a
truth about the victim's worth and thereby contradict the false assertion made
by the offense. When wounds are fresh, hatred and resentment, anger and
indignation may even be the best way in which we are capable of participating
in God's negative judgment on the offensive deed. Nevertheless, the more
the Christian forgiver enters into the Divine point of view, the more s/he will
see that s/he does not need them. For such false claims are decisively refuted
for the victim now by his/her experience of Divine love. 89 The victim's
experience of God as completely trustworthy convinces him/her that God,
who is as committed to Truth as He is to generosity, will eventually make
these evaluative facts plain to everyone. On the other hand, when we take
matters into our own hands, and/or even see it as our responsibility to do all
we can to make sure that offenders get exactly what they deserve by inflicting
what we regard as comparable suffering, we push ourselves to the brink of
cruelty, handicap ourselves for divine collaboration, and even find ourselves
opposing God. Nevertheless, endorsing this aspect of my model in no way
commends, as Murphy fears, disrespectful or insensitive treatment of others
who respond to grave injury with retributive emotions and attitudes (e.g., the
victims of the Camelback rapist).90 From a Christian point of view, the endurance of extreme suffering commands respect on its own; we do not withdraw respect when the victim deploys less than ideal coping strategies (at
least those that do not seriously injure other comparatively innocent people),
because it is impressive that a human being can deal with such suffering at
all. After all, Christ paid horrendous suffering the ultimate compliment, by
identifying Himself with it on the cross.
(7.2.5) Forgiveness and Reform
Kolnai and Murphy see the reform of the offender as something distinct
from, yet related to forgiveness. For them, the forgiver will express his commitment to Value or moral principles, his/her self-respect, by hoping or wishing for the offender's repentance and reform; likewise, such change of heart
and ways by the offender constitutes a reason and/or a desirable consequence
of forgiveness.
The Christian model I am proposing also sees forgiveness and reform as
distinct but related. Since God aims at the growth and reform of the offender
into a person who shares in His projects, the believer who forgives will also
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desire and pray for the success of these goals. At the same time, s/he will see
the offender's education, like his/her own, as fundamentally God's responsibility. For we human beings can become persons who love creatively and
sacrificially as God does, only through a process that develops our freedom.
But when we human beings set out to do all we can to reform someone else,
we become overly manipulative, as Murphy notes, disrespectful of his/her
freedom. Only Divine pedagogy has the power, the insight, and the love for
its pupil required to combine success with respect.

(7.3) Condonation versus Vocation?
At this point, it may be objected that my model collapses Christian forgiveness into condonation, much as Kolnai and Murphy suspected. How does the
required release of retributive emotions and attitudes fit with self-respect for
the victim? Doesn't leaving the offender's reform to God amount to passive
acquiescence in evil? Does not the Christian view prevent either from being
compatible with respect for Value or Moral Principles?
I reject these charges. Although my model locates the Christian's primary
commitment in his/her relationship to God (as opposed to impersonal and
abstract Value or Moral Principles), it still makes Christian forgiveness compatible with appropriate regard for the values with which Kolnai and Murphy
are most concerned. (i) The victim's self-respect and sense of self-worth will
be assured by his/her renewed and deepened sense of God's love for him/her.
(ii) Nor will Christian forgiveness require anyone to hold false beliefs about
the worth of persons or the wrongness or harmfulness of the offense. On the
contrary, the victim's divinely assisted attempts to enter deeply first into
his/her own point of view and then to see things as God does, will leave
him/her with a more nearly accurate, truthful understanding of the situation.
The Christian leaves the definitive and universal revelation of evaluative facts
to God, because He is the only one who fully understands them; Christ is the
only Teacher whose pedagogy is wise enough to ensure that these truths will
be understood by everyone.
(iii) Nor, contrary to Kolnai's and Murphy's fears, does such humility
connive with evil via passive collaboration. For Christians see themselves as
partners (albeit very junior) in God's creative and redemptive work, and
God's intention to defeat evil with good is invincible. If the ultimate responsibility for success lies with Divine management, Divine vocations assign
created co-workers varying and limited shares of the action. Although there
will be some occasions when the call is to silent non-resistance (as "turn the
other cheek" and "walk the second mile" suggest), more often the Christian
will see him/herself called to a more active role in the public and private
identification of and opposition to wrongs, in individual and collective moral
education and reform. Bible stories and Christian history illustrate the varied
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emphases of Christian vocation in proclaiming Good News and opposing
eviJ.91 What is pernicious from a Christian point of view is not active opposition to evil and the promotion of reform, but the notion that "everything
depends on us" with its correlative zeal for success that outruns human
wisdom and power to insure it.
(7.4) Relationships, How Restored?

My model makes forgiveness a process within the context of a triangular
relationship, among the victim, the offender, and God. As such, the victim's
(divinely assisted) moves towards forgiveness are formally constitutive of
changes in that relationship. Does Christian forgiveness also require of the
victim such trust of the offender as to "welcome him/her back with open
arms" (it la Morris) into any close personal association they may have had?
Does it at least involve a preparedness to do so should the offender be willing?
Does hesitancy on the victim's part to renew and restore relationship signal
a limitation on his/her willingness to forgive?
The answer, I think, is "not necessarily." To be sure, forgiveness is valued
in no small measure for the fruit of relationship-renewal, for the way it makes
life-together possible, tolerable, and rewarding among imperfect human beings. Yet, Christian forgiveness digs deeply enough into its object to recognize the roots of some offense and disharmony in the entrenched but
inefficient adaptational strategies of created parties to the dispute. If the
complete healing and transformation of any created person is too big for
anyone but God, it is usually a long-term project, requiring no less than the
creature's earthly lifetime. God deals with each person according to a unique
syllabus, with the result that two human beings may be "out of phase," in
such a way as to make close and fruitful interaction impossible. The victim
may forgive and extend the olive branch of renewed friendship, only to be
turned down by the offender. But equally, the offender may be eager to go
back to the way things were before because s/he does not recognize him/herself as having done anything wrong (as is often the case with racist or sexist
offenders) and be turned down by the victim, the latter's forgiveness notwithstanding. Again, parties to a painful divorce may genuinely forgive one another, but realize that, given who each is at the moment, any sort of close
personal interaction is inadvisable. Such realism is compatible with Christian
forgiveness, which sincerely entrusts the offender to God's loving dealing
with him/her, and prays for the fulfillment of God's Kingdom, when reconciliation will be complete. Put otherwise, reconciliation and renewed relationship are Christian ideals, ultimate responsibility for which rests with God;
no created person can make them happen. The Christian who forgives is
required to trust neither him/herself nor the offender, but God, and to view
relationship-renewal in the context of vocation.
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(7.5) Christian Forgiveness, an Obligation
Forgiveness is a peculiarly Christian obligation, for (i) it is one to which
the offender has no correlative right, and (ii) one that the victim lacks sufficient resources to fulfill. For Kolnai and Murphy, (i) threatens to make forgiveness by the victim unreasonable and immoral; for Twambley and Morris,
(i) identifies forgiveness as a "free" and "generous" act. For Morris, (ii) gives
forgiveness a mysterious and transcendent dimension. For the Christian, the
obligation to forgive arises out of his/her fundamental commitment to God,
his/her call to see as God sees and love as God loves; it is an obligation to
be generous as God is generous. Divine generosity meets the creature's imitative effort with miraculous aid, enabling the victim to forgive. And so, at
bottom, forgiveness is (as Morris suggests) a gift bestowed on victim and
offender alike, a beautiful aspect of human life, a sign of a benign universeChristians would say, an advertisement of its gracious Maker!
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